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10. Ireland. The Rise of Populism on the Left and Among Independents 
 
Jane Suiter 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the state of scholarship on political populism in Ireland, 
examines relevant research that explores definitional issues, and identifies Irish populist 
political actors. Although little research exists on populism and the role of the media or its 
impact on voters, the chapter takes a quick look at the increasing coverage of populism in the 
media, which was especially pronounced following the economic crisis in 2008. In the Irish 
literature, Fianna Fáil, the once-dominant party, is the political actor that has most commonly 
been associated with populism, at least until the mid-2000s. Since then, much focus has been 
on Sinn Féin, widely perceived as the new populist party, which emerged with an anti-
austerity agenda following the economic crisis. 
 
Research on Populism in Ireland 
There is a small but growing literature on populism in Ireland and some consensus that, 
historically, populism has been largely empty populism with traces of anti-elitism, with the 
latter strengthening in the wake of the financial crisis (see Chapter 2 in this volume for an 
explanation of types of populism). It should be noted that Ireland has been excluded from 
classification in previous research on populism—an exclusion that has been contested (see, 
for example, Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Swank & Betz, 2003). Kitschelt and McGann 
(1995) excluded the case of Ireland on the grounds that it is not a post-industrial society, and 
more recently, Kitschelt (2007, p. 1193) has claimed that the socioeconomic conditions and 
weakness of this welfare state should exclude Ireland from any analysis of populism. 
However, this claim is contested by Irish scholars (McDonnell, 2008; McGuickian, 2014; 
O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015), who argue that while Ireland 
may never have been an industrial country, it certainly has the characteristics of a post-
industrial one (O’Malley, 2008). 
 
For many authors, the traditional puzzle is that populism has been mild, and most parties, 
when they ascend to government, tend toward responsibility rather than responsiveness (Mair, 
2013). Traditionally, the larger parties have long been characterized as catch-all parties, prone 
to a degree of populism that is deployed in order to build and secure broad-based coalitions 
of support (Mair & Marsh, 2004, pp. 234–263); in other words, these parties implement a 
form of empty populism with references and appeals to the people rather than focused anti-
elitism or exclusion of out-groups. In short, the consensus view is that, until recently, politics 
in the Republic has always been characterized by what Canovan (1981, pp. 12−13) terms 
politicians’ populism, meaning “broad, non-ideological, coalition-building that draws on the 
unificatory appeal of ‘the people.’” 
 
Some authors stress the presence of anti-elitist populism more than others, often referring to 
rhetoric that is broadly anti-political and anti mediaelites (based in the capital), or to older 
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anti-imperial rhetoric against Britain. McDonnell (2008) argues, for example, that if we take 
the definition of populism to include claims about “the other,” then Ireland was “nearly 
unimpeachable with its twin pillars of the worthy plain Catholic people of Ireland on one side 
and the common enemy (and easy scapegoat for the nation’s ills) of Britain and its liberal 
culture on the other” (p. 200). In a similar vein, Varley and Curtin (2006) examine the “small 
man” strand of populism, where state agents are prepared to intervene on behalf of the small 
man, or the “little guy.” Though much attenuated today (Varley & Curtin, 2002), this strand 
of populism has never entirely disappeared in Ireland. Thus, in their case study on populist-
type state interventions—such as area partnerships (local and community enterprise groups)—
Varley and Curtin argue that these present themselves as capable of generating the “power 
to” negotiate relationships of domination and exploitation for the benefit of those historically 
left disadvantaged by the play of dominating and exploiting “power over” forces. In other 
areas, Varley (2009) returns to this narrative, arguing that the populist frame is useful for 
understanding the “underdog,” or anti-elitist, narrative around agricultural and rural politics. 
 
McDonnell (2008, p. 210) argues that if we define populism as do Albertazzi and McDonnell 
(2008, p. 3)—an approach which “pits a virtuous and homogenous people against a set of 
elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to 
deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice”—then 
much of 20th century Irish politics might be conceived as populist. 
 
There is less agreement on whether any of the Irish parties can be categorized as anti–out-
group. Kitching (2013) suggests that the “punitive” policies on asylum put forward by the 
government parties, Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats, during a referendum 
campaign on the withdrawal of citizenship rights in 2004 contained anti-asylum populism 
(Fanning, 2002; Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 2007; Garner, 2007). This analysis is disputed 
by others such as O’Malley (2008); he argues that mainstream parties are actively pro-
immigration and none has made the issue party political. 
 
In general, until recently, the focus for many scholars was the absence of a far-right anti-out-
group party (McDonnell, 2008; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015). Due partly 
to a lack of clarity in the definition of populism, with many assuming that it included anti-out-
group rhetoric, some argued that populism did not exist in Ireland. More recently, this view 
has been undergoing a change, as will be discussed later in the chapter. 
 
Few authors claim complete populism is present in Ireland, but one exception is O’Connell 
(2003), who theorizes from a social psychological perspective that Irish conservatism is 
shifting—indeed, has shifted—from a traditional Catholic clericalism to a complete-type 
populism. He argues that this populism is (a) radical, in that its advocates often reject 
important elements of consensus politics; (b) right-wing, in that it includes a component 
of hostility to foreigners or outsiders; and (c) populist, in the sense that its rhetoric seeks to 
exploit an alleged chasm between an unrepresentative political elite and an unrepresented 
general public. 
 
In terms of the broad structure of the literature, much of the work on populism in Ireland has 
been broadly theoretical or descriptive in nature, with arguments centered around which 
elements of populism do, or do not, apply to Ireland. A small number of papers are broadly 
empirical (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2010; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015). 
Much of the literature is based in political science, communications, and legal studies 
(Campbell, 2008; FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2010; Kitching, 2013; McGuickian, 2014; 
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O’Mahony, 2009; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015), and all build on the 
theoretical work of Canovan (1981), Taggart (2000), and Mudde (2010). Others approach the 
subject from a sociological perspective (Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 2007; Garner, 2007; 
Maillot, 2005; Varley, 2009; Varley & Curtin, 2002) or from a social psychological 
perspective (O’Connell, 2003). 
 
Regarding method, almost all the papers are built on case studies. The exception is a 
comparative country study (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 2010) that investigates the emergence of 
populism as a possible side effect of the Europeanization of political competition by using a 
different system of case study analysis and, as examples, the Republics of Ireland and Poland. 
There are also a few chapters in explicitly comparative books (McDonnell, 2008; O’Malley 
and FitzGibbon, 2015), while survey data, based on the Irish National Election Study, is the 
basis of O’Malley’s work (2008). 
 
The typology of populism set out by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) is a useful tool for analysis 
(see Chapter 2 in this volume). Utilizing the complete, excluding, anti-elitist, and empty 
populism framework, we can see variety. As already mentioned, the tradition in Ireland has 
consisted of forms of empty populism with copious reference to the people. Empty populism 
was honed by Fianna Fáil but also emulated by other smaller parties and independents. 
In addition, elements of anti-elitist populism were manifested in two distinct ways. One was 
the rhetoric directed at the British, and the other, at those in power in Dublin’s center, thus 
appealing to local rural voters. No real attempts have been made at excluding populism, with 
all parties avoiding this type at an institutional level—with the exception of the citizenship 
referendum, which sought to deny citizenship to Irish-born children of parents who were both 
foreign nationals (see below). 
 
The literature focuses on a number of structural factors that facilitate populism, most 
particularly political culture and the party system. History and political culture are intertwined 
in some accounts (O’Malley, 2008; Varley, 2009; Varley & Curtin, 2006), with a good deal of 
emphasis placed on the position of Ireland as a small, post-colonial island, and this identity 
underpins populist, often anti-British, rhetoric. McGuickian (2014) has argued that populist 
politics are dispersed across society; the origins of the party system are unabashedly populist. 
O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015), McDonnell (2008), and Dowling (1997) also pointed in this 
direction. FitzGibbon and Guerra (2010) focused on the Europeanization of party competition 
and argued that it is just part of the explanation for the emergence of populism. 
 
McDonnell (2008) drew attention to the “anti-political climate,” or a widespread sense of 
“political malaise” that is the loss of trust in, and developing cynicism about, political 
institutions and actors, or what Brandenburg (2005, p. 297) described as “a rather 
homogeneous anti-politics bias.” In many ways, the history of Ireland’s party system is 
synonymous with the long-dominant party Fianna Fáil; from 1948 through 2002, the party 
averaged a 45% share of the vote, and as a result, it spent 65 of the 79 years from 1932 to 
2011 in government, making it one of the most dominant parties in Western Europe. Its status 
as a populist party is generally uncontested up until 2011. Fianna Fáil’s large following has 
traditionally cut across class divisions, justifying its image as a national movement. As a 
result, it is perhaps unsurprising that the literature, until very recent years, has focused on 
Fianna Fáil and its leaders. 
 
Mair (1979) identified Fianna Fáil as a relevant anti-system party in terms of Sartori’s 
classification of polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1976, pp. 131–145). Others have also referred to 
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the party’s populist characteristics. McDonnell (2008) pointed to Garvin (1977), who referred 
to the party as a “nationalist-populist” party, and to Murphy (2003, p. 1), who termed it 
“a classically populist party”. 
 
O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015) argued that there is also a distinctly anti-party sentiment in 
much of public discourse and point to the rising success of independent or non-party 
politicians. In the 2011 election, independents (including some micro-parties) received 13% 
of the vote, compared with seven percent in 2007. At the 2014 European Parliament and 
local elections, independents and small parties received 30% of the vote. O’Malley and 
FitzGibbon argued that independents often portray themselves and campaign in populist 
tones. The rhetoric from independents (which seems to resonate with many people) tries to 
portray parties as somehow craven and without principle. Independents say that they will 
put people before party and ask to move democracy on without parties (O’Malley & 
FitzGibbon, 2015). 
 
Indeed, there is broad agreement that a clearer populist narrative began to emerge after the 
2008 financial crisis and during and after the 2011 general election that sought to characterize 
Ireland’s economic woes as an unjust action brought about by a corrupt Irish political elite 
beholden to a cabal of bankers and European Union politicians (FitzGibbon & Guerra, 
2010; Kitching, 2013; McDonnell, 2008; O’Malley, 2008; O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 
2015). 
 
The party most associated with this line of thought is Sinn Féin. For example, Sinn Féin’s 
main ideologue and strategist, Ó Broin (2014), wrote an article, “In Defence of Populism,” in 
the Irish Left Review in response to a piece by a leading political editor of The Sunday 
Business Post. While acknowledging that populism can be progressive or reactionary, 
democratic or authoritarian, Sinn Féin’s brand is “democratic, egalitarian and 
progressive.” Ó Broin argued that Sinn Féin’s entire political project—including its 
opposition to austerity—is populist, and unashamedly so, but he stressed that the Sunday 
Business Post editor had a wrong understanding of populism. That understanding was based 
on an unstated prejudice, and it betrayed a worldview that is deeply distrustful of popular 
opinion and the ability of people to know what is in their own best interests (Ó Brion, 2014). 
 
Sinn Féin displays significant Euroskepticism, urging a rejection of all recent EU treaties. 
FitzGibbon and Guerra (2010) argue that Sinn Féin has used Euroskepticism for ruthlessly 
strategic reasons that can easily be misconstrued as populism. McDonnell stresses that while 
Fianna Fáil continued to use Irish nationalism to attack Fine Gael and Labor, it became less 
populist, and by the 2000s, Fianna Fáil was “merely dipping into the populist toolbox with 
occasional forays into Euroskepticism” (McDonnell, 2008, p. 210). Their mantel had instead 
been taken on by Sinn Féin and the independents. 
 
Another relatively unusual element of the Irish political system is the reasonably frequent use 
of referenda, which must be held at the time of every EU treaty change and every change in 
the Constitution. Kitching (2013) has pointed to the mobilization of populist anti-EU actors in 
referenda campaigns, as have FitzGibbon and Guerra (2010). Kitching (2013, p. 125) 
identified “hostage takers,” who mainly participate indirectly in the electoral system but who 
mobilize around referenda and hold politicians to ransom on specific issues. In a thorough 
review of the dynamics in referenda on changes to the European Treaties that could have an 
impact on sovereignty implicit in the Irish constitution, O’Mahony (2009) investigated the 
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emergence of a dynamic in Irish referenda on EU treaties that had two key elements: elite 
withdrawal and populist capture. 
 
One referendum on the withdrawal of Irish citizenship rights for “non-national” children is 
particularly cited in this regard. This 2004 referendum distinguished existing citizens of the 
nation-state from Irish-born children of immigrants hitherto entitled to citizenship (Fanning & 
Mutwarasibo, 2007). In popular parlance, it was a distinction between “nationals” and 
 “non-nationals” and was backed by all of the main political parties. The referendum as a 
political response to immigration was also bound up with the politics of economic growth and 
distributional conflict. Here, a radicalized conception of citizenship was articulated within 
populist political responses to immigration and “maternity tourism” (Fanning & Mutwarasibo, 
2007). 
 
Populist Actors as Communicators 
A small part of the literature has focused on populist actors as communicators—in particular, 
on leaders and individual independents in terms of their charisma and particular styles. 
McDonnell (2008) pointed out that in typically populist rhetoric, Fianna Fáil leaders such as 
De Valera and Lynch explicitly defined Fianna Fáil as a “national movement” that was 
representative of all people rather than as a “political party” (Mair, 1987, p. 178). He 
pointed to De Valera’s vision of Ireland, which was explicitly communicated in populist 
terms akin to Taggart’s concept of the populist “heartland.” 
 
For O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015), Fianna Fáil spent much of its time communicating 
Irishness in terms of Gaelic (Irish-speaking, cultural) Catholicism in opposition to Britishness, 
which was seen as Protestant, English-speaking, and colonial. In early election literature, 
Fianna Fáil tried to frame the choice facing the electorate as “the masses against the classes,” 
arguing that the existing government was “by the rich … for the rich.” According to one 
commentator on Fianna Fáil, it used “a large dollop of populist politics” with an emphasis on 
high pay for politicians and “jobbery” (corrupt handing out of state jobs) (Whelan, 2012, p. 
47). 
  
O’Malley and FitzGibbon (2015) argued that Sinn Féin is tightly controlled by Adams, its 
long-time leader. One Sinn Féin representative has said of Adams that he “has the charisma of 
a pop star” (Rafter, 2005, p. 6). Attempts were made to deify Adams as a “Leader, Visionary, 
Peacemaker” when he was arrested in connection with the kidnapping and murder of a 
woman in the early 1970s. Murals were painted on walls in Belfast. 
 
O’Malley (2014) argued that the party’s strong anti-austerity populist messaging suits the 
party’s narrative of Irish nationalism—the downtrodden Irish as a victim of British 
imperialism. He argued that Sinn Féin is a populist nationalist party that claims to be to the 
left. In this way it is similar to the French Front National in economic policy (though not with 
regard to immigration). However, there has been no systematic examination of unique 
strategies that distinguish populist from mainstream communication or of differences in the 
language deployed by populists of the left and the right. 
 
The Media and Populism 
There is little explicit literature on the media and populism in Ireland. One exception is 
Curran’s 1994 Ph.D thesis, which documented the role of the now-defunct Irish Press in 
Fianna Fáil’s hegemony over an extended period of time and in mediating the party’s populist 
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ideology. That newspaper was founded by Fianna Fáil leader de Valera and was always a 
strong, partisan supporter of the party. Reflecting the party’s populism was a core editorial 
strategy. In addition, McMenamin, Flynn, O’Malley, and Rafter (2013) presented a content 
analysis of the coverage of 12 national newspapers during the 2011 Irish general election. 
They tested whether (and why) politics is framed as a game between competing teams or as a 
debate about issues and policies, presenting a choice between political parties and ideologies. 
They did not find a homogeneous frame, although the crisis election did increase the 
proportion of coverage given to issues compared with 2002 and 2007. 
 
However, the authors did not engage with questions on how populist actors and their 
communicative strategies resonate with journalistic media, nor did they engage in an 
examination of populist discourse or how individual media outlets deal with populist 
discourse. In addition, no work has yet been published on how populist actors and 
communications resonate in non-journalistic online media like blogs, forums, and social 
networks. These areas are ripe for study; figures garnered from LexisNexis demonstrate that 
mentions of populism almost trebled from 22 to 60 from 2012 to 2014. Thus, an examination 
of the content and framing of populist communication would be timely. 
 
Citizens and Populism 
The most explicit study on voters most likely respond to populist rhetoric (O’Malley, 2008) 
focused primarily on Sinn Féin voters. The party has been in existence since the foundation of 
the state but has only been in the national electoral arena in the Republic in more recent years. 
The first Sinn Féin representative entered Parliament in 1997, to be joined by four more in 
2002, rising to 14 in 2011. Prior to the 2008 crisis, it was generally puzzling that although 
Sinn Féin had the most typical populist voters of all Irish voters, the party itself did not 
succumb to anti-out-group rhetoric. McDonnell (2008) pointed to Laver (2005), who found 
that at the 2002 election voters were predominately young (average age 36), male (58%), and 
more likely to be low-income than voters of all other parties, except Fianna Fáil. Moreover, 
as Garry, Hardiman, & Payne (2006) found, they are more likely to have low levels of 
political knowledge, low trust of the existing parties, and a low sense of their political 
efficacy. In other words, they are the most alienated voters in the Republic (McDonnell, 2008) 
and appear to hold the most obvious anti out-group sentiments (O’Malley, 2008). 
 
To unravel the puzzle, scholars have generally examined why Sinn Féin does not espouse 
these views despite the profile of many of its supporters. O’Malley (2008) argued that the 
nature of Irish nationalism makes it difficult for such a party to engage in anti-immigrant 
rhetoric commonly associated with far-right parties, despite the fact that some of its 
supporters hold views consistent with this form of nationalism. 
 
Others such as McDonnell (2008), argued that Sinn Féin, rather than presenting a major risk 
of developing into a populist radical right party, acts as a bulwark against others entering the 
system. He argued: The main obstacle impeding the emergence of a new populist party is 
the recent success of the left-wing nationalist party Sinn Féin, which, while unwilling (and 
unable) to embrace anti-minority or anti-pluralist positions, not only displays many of the 
characteristics of populism, but has occupied much of the political and electoral space where a 
populist challenger (of the Right or Left) would seek to locate itself. (McDonnell, 2008, p. 
198) For example, Sinn Féin’s Members Training Programme, as Maillot (2005) has noted, 
differentiates between “ideology” and “principles.” While the latter constitute immutable 
“fundamental truths,” such as the sovereignty of a 32-county, united Irish Republic, the 
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former can be flexible—which works because “21st century populism is a constantly evolving 
concept,” thus playing to the populist tendency to pick and choose from different ideologies 
according to the needs of the moment (Maillot, 2005, p. 4). 
 
Kitching (2013, p. 125) identified Sinn Féin members as “gatekeepers” who attract the votes 
of the populist radical right but who have not behaved like them thus far. He argued that Sinn 
Féin occupies the position of potential populist radical-right challengers. Sinn Féin would 
completely deny any relationship to the radical right on the basis of its avowedly left-wing 
economic positions. However, some have argud that it is not unusual for populist 
radical- right parties to espouse instrumentalist left-wing economics for temporary gain, 
sometimes even using economics as a tool to attain support among their perceived “in-group” 
while excluding outsiders (Kitching, 2013). 
 
However, there is no systematic research on inter-individual differences in reactions to 
populist messages or on the effects of populist messages on citizens’ emotions toward 
political actors or society and the political system. Nor is there yet any research on the effects 
of populist messages on citizens’ knowledge, opinions and attitudes, or political behaviors. 
 
Summary and Recent Developments 
In general, the literature argues that support for empty and anti-elite populism is strong, and 
voters tend to reward parties that engage in it. Recent support has developed following the 
2011 general election, and little discussion has yet made its way into the scholarly literature. 
In 2012–2013, the rise of SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain galvanized the debate 
about populism, with the term “populism” becoming increasingly conspicuous. An increasing 
amount of attention has been paid to the phenomenon in the media. This salience has 
coincided with a rise in the opinion polls of both Sinn Féin and the independents. 
 
Indeed, public support for Sinn Féin has grown steadily over the years since the 2011 general 
election, almost doubling from 10% to a high of 24% in December 2014. The other clear 
pattern is the rise in support for independents, a peculiarly Irish phenomenon. As Bolleyer and 
Weeks (2009) have argued, independents can do and say what they want on the campaign 
trail, adopting all sorts of populist doctrines without having to preach responsible politics. 
Independents, too, have almost doubled support, from 15% at the last general election to 27% 
in early 2015. In short, there is general scholarly agreement largely based on case studies 
that anti-elitist populism is common, was honed in the 20th century by Fianna Fáil, and is 
now carried on by Sinn Féin and the independents. In general, while there has been some 
research into populism in Ireland, most has focused on the actors themselves and deals little 
with citizens and even less with the media. Further work in these areas would no doubt 
be illuminating. 
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